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This paper defends a version of common sense epistemology, influ-
enced by the work of Thomas Reid, according to which appeals to
common sense can play a defeasible evidentiary role in philosophical
arguments. 1 Such a Reidian common sense epistemology is committed
to a version of epistemic conservatism. Commonly epistemic conserva-
tives offer an individualistic epistemology, arguing that if an individual
believes a proposition the mere fact that the individual believes it pro-
vides it with a certain favorable epistemic status for him or her. 2 In
contrast, the form of epistemic conservatism defended in this paper is
non-individualistic; if we are committed to something (for example, a
particular ontological position or principle) then this gives my commit-
ment to the thing a favorable epistemic status. 3 The Reidian common
1. In calling the position I wish to defend, Reidian common sense epistemol-
ogy, I am suggesting that the position is inspired by that of Thomas Reid, not that
he himself would have endorsed it in full. In particular, the position I am advocating
is a non-individualistic common sense philosophy. Although Reid himself is a fore-
father of non-individualistic epistemology, as I hope to show in the second section
of this paper, there are sometimes individualistic passages in his own texts, which
often seem to appeal to individual intuitions of self-evidence.
2. So, for example, Richard Foley explains that “epistemic conservatism is
the view that a proposition acquires a favorable epistemic status for a person simply
by being believed by him” (1983, p. 165) (the references for the articles of this
issue can be found below, p. 89). Similarly Hamid Vahid explains that “epistemic
conservatism comes in many forms, the most basic of which asserts that the mere
possession of a belief confers justification on that belief. So an agent is justified in
holding a belief simply in virtue of the fact of holding it” (2004, p. 98).
3. In addition, while most defenders of common sense epistemology place
the status of beliefs at the core of their concerns, for the Reidian common sense
epistemologist, it makes more sense to talk of common sense commitments rather
than beliefs. For we may be implicitly committed to certain principles or to a certain
ontology without explicitly having any beliefs about the matter. Our commitments
may be implicit in our ways of talking, rather than something anyone actually
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sense epistemologist, then, thinks that there exists a shared common-
sense metaphysics, including a common-sense metaphysics of mind,
and our default position should be to accept the deliveries of this meta-
physics. In disputes, the burden of proof lies with the opponent of
common sense metaphysics, and unless we have positive reasons to
reject the deliverances of common-sense metaphysics, we should
endorse them. Thus, what I am calling Reidian Common Sense episte-
mology can be expressed by the following principle:
Principle of Common Sense: If a commitment is a part of common sense, then
it is incumbent upon the opponent of the position to provide positive reasons to
reject the commitment. In the absence of a preponderance of positive arguments
against a common sense commitment, we should remain committed to it.
For example, I am attracted to process metaphysics. However,
I think that substance-property metaphysics is a part of common sense.
Therefore, I think that the onus is on the proponent of process meta-
physics to provide us with a positive argument to prefer process meta-
physics over a substance ontology. Common sense epistemology, then,
involves a methodological principle about where the burden of proof
lies in philosophical arguments.
Unfortunately, it is not self-evident which commitments and con-
cepts are a part of common sense and which are merely local preju-
dices. In particular, the fact that something seems obvious to me is not
a good reason to judge that it is part of common-sense, for this feeling
of self-evidence may just be the result of local prejudice. In contrast,
some contemporary epistemic conservatives, who label themselves
“dogmatists”, argue for the evidentiary value of what they call “episte-
mic seemings”; if something seems true to me, then this is defeasible
evidence for its truth. 4 The version of epistemic conservatism defended
in this paper, rejects such forms of dogmatism for being too individual-
istic and not worried enough about local prejudices. For even though
elements of common sense are likely to be the sort of things that seem
obvious and self-evident, there are many other ways beliefs can come
believes. Whether such commitments can be cashed out in terms of beliefs is not
clear, and is beyond the scope of this paper, so in order to remain neutral on this
issue I prefer to talk about common sense commitments rather than common sense
beliefs. And I will sometimes talk about commitment to “things” to remain as
neutral as possible and avoid belief talk.
4. There have been a slew of papers over the last fifteen years or so defending
various forms of “dogmatism” which, as a Kant scholar I don’t particularly like as
a name, and so prefer “epistemic conservatism”. See for example Pryor (2000),
Tucker (2010), Huemer (2007). And for recent criticism of this new dogmatism, see
White (2006), Wright (2008).
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Common Sense and Comparative Linguistics 73
to acquire this property. For example things we have been taught, or
beliefs that are widespread in our local community often seem obvious
and self-evident, and it is possible that as a result of (philosophical)
education there may be beliefs that seem obvious and self-evident to
us, but which are inconsistent with common sense. One example of such
a belief, Reid suggests, is the belief of those educated philosophically
in the Humean tradition that the immediate objects of perception are
ideas. Thus, the fact that something seems self-evident to an individual
is unlikely to be good evidence that it is part of common sense, as it is
quite possible, and I suspect probable, that most of the things that seem
self-evident to us are not part of common sense. Thus, for the Reidian
epistemic conservative, introspection and reflection are not reliable
methods to discover what belongs to common sense. The methodology
of common sense should not appeal to individual “intuitions”. Reidian
common sense epistemology is committed to a form of epistemic exter-
nalism, whereas contemporary dogmatists seem to be committed to a
form of epistemic internalism.
One central feature of common sense commitments is their univer-
sality; everyone of sound mind is committed to them. And, following
Thomas Reid, I will argue that the best evidence that a commitment
has the universality required for it to be part of our common-sense
metaphysics is that it is to be found in all languages. This is the best
evidence we have that a judgment has the right sort of universality that
common sense requires. Thus, common-sense epistemology cannot be
based on a priori armchair reflection but requires empirical investiga-
tion into which aspects of our conceptual scheme are genuinely univer-
sal. Such empirical research cannot justify particular claims, but can
help establish where the burden of proof lies in particular arguments.
Such a methodology is at the heart of Thomas Reid’s own common sense
philosophy.
Common sense philosophy and epistemic conservatism are often
thought to be conducive to political conservatism. 5 And indeed, in 19th
century Anglophone philosophy there was a tendency for members of
the common sense tradition to be political conservatives opposed to the
political radicalism of Bentham and Mill and their followers. And
I suspect that the dogmatic appeal to individual intuitions about the
self-evidence of particular beliefs is likely to be congenial to political
conservatives, for such intuitions are often the expression of local preju-
dice. The version of epistemic conservatism defended in this paper, in
contrast, does not have such political consequences, as it is centrally
5. See, for example, Nyíri (2016).
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concerned with drawing the line between judgments of common sense
and expressions of local prejudice, and offers a methodology for under-
mining local prejudice.
After briefly motivating and providing evidence that Reid himself
argues for such a position I will, in the second half of this paper, compare
Reidian epistemic conservatism to a more radical position according to
which translatability into all other natural languages is a criterion for the
validity of philosophical arguments. Now, I do think there is something
attractive about such a position. There are often times, for example, when
a perfectly good seeming argument in English is just not translatable into
another language, and such problems with translation often give us pause
for thought. Sometimes the reason is easy to understand, and the attempt
to translate can make us aware of problems in arguments. For example,
at the start of chapter four of Utilitarianism, Mill argues that,
The only proof capable of being given that an object is visible, is that
people actually see it. The only proof that a sound is audible, is that people
hear it: and so of the other sources of our experience. In like manner, I appre-
hend, the sole evidence it is possible to produce that anything is desirable, is
that people do actually desire it. (2003, p. 210 – emphasis added)
Now, in English this argument has a certain force because of the
syntactic similarity of “visible”, “audible” and “desirable”. But syntac-
tic form can be deceptive. “Visible” and “audible” mean “can be seen”
and “can be heard”, but “desirable” does not mean “can be desired”.
But if we translate it into, say, German it is clear that the surface
plausibility of the argument rests on a contingent fact about English. In
German, visible is sichtbar, and audible is hörbar whereas the natural
translation of desirable in this context is wünschenswert – which could
be translated as “worth desiring”. Now, in this case, translating into a
foreign language may make a problem in a particular argument trans-
parent. But such translation is not necessary to realize the weakness in
the argument as many contemporary critics of Mill noticed the problem
with his argument without having to go through the trouble of translating
it, so we do not need to engage in translation to recognize such prob-
lems, although it is clear that translating can sometimes help up attend
to such problems. And so I think that the lack of translatability of an
argument into another language should give us reasons to question the
validity of an argument.
While translation can draw our attention to problems in arguments
and appeals to what is universal in language can play a justificatory role
in philosophical arguments, providing evidence for where the burden
of proof lies, translatability should not be given a stronger role. In
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Common Sense and Comparative Linguistics 75
particular, I will reject a more radical position, defended by Anna
Wierzbicka and other proponents of natural language meta-semantics,
which argues that we should only trust arguments that are, at least in
principle, translatable into all other natural languages. I will argue,
then, that while appeals to empirical facts about comparative linguists
can have an epistemological role in determining where the burden of
proof lies in particular philosophical arguments, they should not be
given a semantic role in determining whether or not particular claims
should be counted as meaningful. The reason I reject the semantic role
of appeals to common sense is that, unlike Wierzbika, I reject the claim
that apart from innate primitive concepts, all other concepts have a
compositional definitional structure. But, I think that if one is sympa-
thetic to the idea that all concepts are either innate or compositional,
then one should be sympathetic to a position like Wierzbika’s. I take
this, however, to be a reductio argument against such a compositional
semantics. One person’s modus ponens is another’s modus tollens.
An example of mistaking local prejudice for common sense.
Many English-speaking philosophers take contingent features of
English as features of languages in general, and then illegitimately use
this fact as evidence to support particular philosophical positions. So,
for example, in English and as far as I know all Indo-European langua-
ges (apart, perhaps, from Sanskrit), we distinguish between proposi-
tional attitudes, which are normally expressed by a verb followed by a
“that” clause and objectual attitudes expressed by a verb followed by
a noun phrase. This linguistic fact is one motivation for drawing a sharp
metaphysical distinction between recognizing a particular individual or
thing and seeing-that something is the case, with recognition being
objectual and seeing-that being a propositional attitude with sentence
like content. Central to this way of thinking is the distinction between
term-like entities and sentence-like entities, and the commitment to the
idea that the contents of so-called propositional attitudes are sentence-
like rather than term-like. Often the evidence provided for this distinc-
tion, and exactly where to draw the line between the two quite distinct
types of attitude is given by the way English grammar works.
Thus, for example, Mathew McGrath explains that,
The term “proposition” has a broad use in contemporary philosophy. It is
used to refer to some or all of the following: the primary bearers of truth-value,
the objects of belief and other “propositional attitudes” (i.e., what is believed,
doubted, etc.), the referents of that-clauses, and the meanings of sentences. (2007)
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And he adds a bit later, “one might doubt whether that-clauses
could really refer, if reference is understood on the model of proper
names. For, that-clauses are not proper names, nor are they noun
phrases”. Here McGrath is clearly citing a contingent fact about English
grammar as prima facie evidence for a particular position on the meta-
physics of mind, and in particular on the nature of so-called proposi-
tional attitudes. Such appeals to English grammar, and what seems
natural or unnatural to native English speakers are extremely common
in contemporary work on the metaphysics of mind.
From the perspective of Reidian common sense epistemology, if this
fact about English grammar were universal then it could be used as
defeasible evidence for the claim that when I see that the cat is on the
mat, then I have a mental attitude with sentence-like content, and the
onus would be on the critic of such a position to provide positive argu-
ments to reject the claim. However, it turns out that those who appeal
to such linguistic facts as evidence have been seduced by contingent
facts about Indo-European grammar. For this fact is just a contingent
fact about English and other Indo-European languages. For example,
in contrast to English, in Turkish the (grammatical) objects of what in
English are standardly thought of as propositional attitude verbs are
noun-phrases, not that-clauses. Thus, in Turkish one takes what is the
main verb of the equivalent English that-clause and turns it into a noun
(something like an English gerund), and this verbal noun can be tensed.
The rest of the information in the corresponding English that-clause
then modifies this verbal noun. In Turkish “propositional attitude” verbs
such as “think” [düşünmek] or “believe” [inanmak] are transitive verbs
requiring a noun phrase in the accusative, and they tend to work gram-
matically in the same way as perceptual verbs such as “see” [görmek].
Thus, for example, in Turkish the translation of “I know that the cat is
sitting on the mat” is “Kedinin paspasιn üzerinde oturduğunu biliyo-
rum.” In this Turkish sentence, the main verb is biliyorum, which means
“I know”. The direct object of this verb is otur-duğ-u(n)-u which is a
nominalized verb which could be translated into English as “its sitting”:
“otur” is the stem of the verb oturmak, “to sit”; the “duğ” acts as a
nominalizer forming a noun from the verb stem; the u(n) is the posses-
sive; and the final “u” is the accusative case ending making the word
the grammatical object of the verb “I know”. The Turkish sentence,
then, could be re-translated back into English as “I know [the cat’s on
the mat] its-sitting”. 6
6. Similarly, one would translate the English sentence “I know that the cat
that was sitting on the mat will not come to dinner.” as “Paspasιn üzerinde oturan
kedinin akşam yemeğine gel-me(y)-eceğ-i(n)-i biliyorum”. The object of the verb to
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Common Sense and Comparative Linguistics 77
The important fact here is that Turkish grammar does not, stan-
dardly, use that-clauses to express what in English are called proposi-
tional attitude verbs. Anything that can be expressed in English in a
sentence is transformed into such a noun-phrase if it is to be made the
object of one of these “propositional attitude verbs”. 7 So our linguistic
intuitions about what sounds odd should not be decisive. In this case,
I suggest that the linguistic intuitions of speakers of Indo-European
languages about where to draw the line between when a mental content
is term-like or sentence-like should be given no evidentiary weight in
philosophical arguments. Now, the point of appealing to Turkish
grammar here is not to provide positive evidence for a particular posi-
tion, but rather to merely provide a defeater of a defeater. The fact that
certain things sound unnatural to speakers of European languages is
often taken to be evidence against a particular philosophical position.
Now, if it were the case that a certain way of speaking were to be found
in all languages, this would have some evidentiary value, and the onus
would be on the person rejecting the way of speaking to provide reasons
for rejecting “common sense” here. But contingent facts about particu-
lar languages or language groups should be given no evidentiary weight,
as they all too regularly are in far too much contemporary Anglophone
philosophy, which often reads like the “Philosophy of English”.
This is also a form of argument that Thomas Reid repeatedly makes
and is at the heart of his “common sense” philosophy. Although Reid was
influential on 20th century ordinary language philosophy, Reid himself is
not a proponent of ordinary language philosophy. Instead, as we shall see,
he is best thought of as a proponent of something like “common lan-
guage philosophy”. For he thinks that the best evidence that something
is part of common sense is that it is common to all languages. And he
repeatedly argues that the primary evidence that something is a part of
know here is gel-me(y)-eceğ-i(n)-i. Here, “gel” is the stem of the verb “gelmek”, to
come; the “me(y)” is negation suffix; the “eceğ” functions to nominalize the verb
stem and to mark futurity; the “i(n)” is the possessive, and the final “I” is the
accusative suffix, making this word the direct object of the verb to know (biliyorum).
So this could be translated back into English as “I know its-[(the) cat sitting on the
mat]-not-will-be-coming to diner”.
7. There is a construction that is sometimes used in contemporary Turkish
using “ki”, which functions like “that” in English. But this is a fairly recent import
from Persian, which is also an Indo-European language. Indeed “ki” is etymologi-
cally related to the similarly pronounced French “que”. “The particle ki… is of
Persian origin and behaves very much like the French que or the English ‘that’ in
introducing subordinate clauses that have ordinary main clause verbs.” (Göksel and
Kerslake, 2011, p. 265.)
Revue philosophique, no 1/2021, p. 71 à p. 88
Pixellence - 21-12-20 16:23:18 - (c) Humensis
RE0143 U000 - Oasys 19.00x - Page 77 - BAT









































































common sense is provided by cross-cultural linguistic evidence: dis-
tinctions and structures found in all languages express the “common
sense of mankind”, and the onus is on the opponent of common sense
to provide reasons for rejecting common sense. And so a Reidian
common sense philosopher will think that empirical facts about compar-
ative linguistics have an important evidential role to play in philosophi-
cal arguments in determining where the burden of proof lies in
particular philosophical arguments. In the following section of the paper
I will provide textual evidence for the importance of comparative lin-
guistics for Reid’s methodology.
Thomas Reid on Common Sense and Comparative Linguistics
For Reid, the fact that grammatical features or lexical distinctions
are found in all languages is philosophically significant and should
be taken as providing defeasible evidence for real differences in the
world. Although Reid is often seen as a forerunner of ordinary language
philosophy it is more plausible to regard him as a universal language
philosopher, for what has philosophical significance for Reid is the
agreement of all languages on a certain point, not the contingent fea-
tures of a particular language. Common sense involves judgments that
are, in a sense, universal. And the best evidence that a judgment is
universal is that it is “common in the structure of all languages, ancient
and modern, polished and barbarous” (2002, p. 45). Thus, for example,
Reid argues that the fact that all languages have verbs that require
agents and objects implies that it is part of commonsense ontology that
agents, actions and objects exist. Thus, talking of active transitive
verbs, which he believes exist in all languages, Reid claims that:
we know, that, in all languages, such verbs require a thing or a person
which is the agent, and a noun following in an oblique case, which is the
object. Whence it is evident, that all mankind, both those who have contrived
language, and those who use it with understanding, have distinguished these
three things as different, to wit, the operations of the mind, which are expressed
by active verbs, the mind itself, which is the nominative to those verbs, and
the object, which is, in the oblique case, governed by them. (2002, p. 26)
Reid makes it clear that he regards such evidence as defeasible
arguing that:
A philosopher is, no doubt, entitled to examine even those distinctions that
are to be found in the structure of all languages; and, if he is able to shew that
there is not foundation for them in the nature of the things distinguished – if
he can point out some prejudice common to mankind which has led them to
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Common Sense and Comparative Linguistics 79
distinguish things that are not really different – in that case, such a distinction
may be imputed to a vulgar error, which ought to be corrected in philosophy.
But when in his first setting out, he takes it for granted without proof, that the
distinctions found in the structure of all languages, have no foundation in
nature, this, surely, is too fastidious a way of treating the common sense of
mankind. When we come to be instructed by philosophers, we must bring the
old light of common sense along with us, and by it judge of the new light which
the philosopher communicates to us. […] There may be distinctions that have
a real foundation and which may be necessary in philosophy, which are not
made in common language, because not necessary in the common business of
life. But I believe no instance will be found of a distinction made in all langua-
ges, which has not a just foundation in nature. (2002, p. 26-27)
Similarly Reid believes that the fact that all languages have plurals
implies that all men have notions not only of individual things, but also
of attributes common to many. Thus Reid argues that “all languages
have a plural number in many of their nouns; from which we may infer,
that all men have notions, not of individual things only, but of attributes,
or things which are common to many individuals; for no individual can
have a plural number” (2002, p. 57)
Similarly, he argues that, if all languages make certain lexical dis-
tinctions, this provides us with evidence for the existence of a real
objective distinction. Thus Reid argues that, “to perceive, to remember,
to be conscious and to conceive or imagine, are words common to phi-
losophers, and to the vulgar. They signify different operations of the
mind, which are distinguished in all languages, and by all men that
think. […] and I think they are hardly capable of strict definition.”
(2002, p. 22) Similar appeals to structures or lexical items found in all
languages are to be found throughout all of Reid’s writings.
Now, the main focus of this rest of this paper will be to examine the
limits of appeals to comparative linguistics in philosophy. But before
doing so, I will briefly mention two arguments that could be given to
support the form of common sense epistemology defended in this paper.
There is a large recent literature on epistemic conservatism and dogma-
tism, and a number of the arguments given to support individualistic
internalist epistemic conservatism can be modified to support the non-
individualistic externalist form of Reidian common sense epistemology
defended in this paper. Firstly, there is what, following Lawrence Sklar,
may be called a “transcendental” argument in favor of epistemic con-
servatism. 8 Sklar argues that:
8. The conservative principle Sklar examines in (1975) is the following: “If
you believe some proposition, on the basis of whatever positive warrant may accrue
to it from the evidence, a priori plausibility, and so forth, it is unreasonable to cease
to believe the proposition to be true merely because of the existence of, or knowl-
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If the only place conservatism played a role was as a principle of “last
resort” in a limited number of cases of radical or transient underdetermination,
then the position looks plausible which advocates that we drop the conservative
principle and remain skeptical, or that we take any of the alternative decisions
open to us as permitted and hence rational, or that we accept the recommenda-
tion of the conservative principle but consider our decision to be one of accept-
ing but not believing the hypothesis it favors. But if all our beliefs, even those
founded most directly on the immediate data and those inferred from it by our
most sacred canons of deductive and inductive inference, rest implicitly upon
acceptance of conservatism as a principle for belief, then, I think, we would
be far more reluctant to look upon conservatism as at best an easily dispensed-
with canon of belief. Do we really wish to remain in skeptical indecision about
all our best-supported scientific beliefs? Or take them as, at best, one among
many “permitted” hypotheses? Or take it that we never really have the right to
believe any scientific hypotheses, but at most have the right to “accept” them?
(1975, p. 399)
One interesting thing to note is that although Sklar’s argument starts
off by offering a defense of individualist conservatism, by the end of
the argument he is not talking about individual beliefs but about “our”
best-supported scientific beliefs and about what “we” should believe.
And I think the rhetorical force of this passage rests on its appeal to
our shared commitments rather than to individual, and perhaps idiosyn-
cratic, intuitions and beliefs. So I suggest that such arguments offer
better support for a non-individualistic form of epistemic conservatism.
Secondly, there is a form of argument popularized by Harman, which
has been called the “‘lost justification’ argument”. 9 According to the
individualistic version of the argument, we do not keep track of the jus-
tification relations between beliefs, so we possess many beliefs that
were initially accepted for good reasons, but we no longer remember
the sources of justification. A similar thing may be said for collective
commitments, for we may think of language as containing the congealed
wisdom of many generations. Now, it is not clear why such a form of
argument would favor commitments common to all languages, rather
than any commitments to our local community. However, one may
combine such a “lost justification” argument with a third form of argu-
ment, which we may name the “argument from convergence”. Such an
argument is analogous to a certain form of argument for scientific
realism: structures and distinctions that are found in all languages are
likely to be truth apt because this is the best explanation why distinct
cultures, without interaction, have arrived at a similar model of the
edge of the existence of, alternative incompatible hypotheses whose positive warrant
is no greater than that of the proposition already believed” (p. 378).
9. This is the name given to this form of argument by Vahid (2004, p. 108).
See also Gilbert Harman (1986).
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Common Sense and Comparative Linguistics 81
world expressed in the structure of their languages. This can be com-
bined with the previous form of argument, for the thought is that langua-
ges developed the way they did for (good) reasons, but we are not
necessarily aware of these reasons.
Anna Wierzbicka and Natural Semantic Meta-language
In the final two sections of the paper I will contrast the Reidian
position I wish to defend with a more radical proposal advocated by
proponents of the Natural Semantic Meta-language (NSM) approach to
cognitive semantics. This approach has some affinities to Reid’s
common sense philosophy as it proposes the existence of a universal
core “mini language” shared by all of humankind, and suggests that
the criterion of translatability into this core language can be used to
avoid language specific prejudice. Although I am unaware of proponents
of NSM referencing the Reidian tradition, one can think of this project
as an attempt to capture the “common sense” set of concepts and struc-
tures. However, rather than giving appeals to commons sense an episte-
mic role, showing where the burden of proof may lie in certain
arguments, the defenders of the NSM approach give common sense a
semantic role, arguing that philosophical claims (and claims in the
social sciences and psychology) are only meaningful if in principle
understandable by all, regardless of their natural language. Such
claims, to avoid prejudice, should be translatable into all natural lan-
guages. This is a much more radical position than Reid’s, having some
affinities with the radical anti-metaphysical stance of the early logical
positivists. But, I shall argue, it rests on the implausible premise that
apart from innate primitive concepts, all other concepts have a composi-
tional definitional structure. It is this rejection of the possibility of any
real conceptual novelty and creativity that pushes us from a plausible
epistemic conservatism to an implausible semantic radicalism.
In this section I will focus on the work of the comparative linguist
Anna Wierzbicka, one of the main proponents of the NSM approach,
which is concerned with the discovery of what she takes to be linguistic
and conceptual universals. Her project is inspired by Leibniz’s search
for a lingua naturae, which he took to be an “alphabet of human
thought”. Thus, Wierzbicka quotes a number of key passages from
Leibniz to motivate her position. For example, Leibniz claims that “the
alphabet of human thoughts is the catalogue of primitive concepts, that
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is those concepts which cannot be made clearer by means of any defini-
tions”. 10 Similarly, he argues that “the alphabet of human thoughts is
the catalogue of those concepts which can be understood by themselves,
and from whose combinations our other ideas arise”. 11 And Wierzbicka
summarizes his position in the following terms:
people can understand an infinite number of ideas because they possess a
small number of innate simple concepts that are understandable by themselves.
Different combinations of these simple concepts can generate an infinite
number of complex ones. (2015, p. 383)
Unfortunately, Leibniz himself was unable to get very far with pro-
ducing a list of these simple innate concepts, but he himself suggested
that “languages are the best mirror of the human mind” (1981, p. 330).
And Wierzbicka and her colleagues argue that the best way to discover
this putative list of semantic primitives is through extensive cross-
linguistic research. Thus, the NSM project is to find a set of “linguistic
primes” that are shared by all languages. These linguistic primes seem
to correspond to the common sense concepts shared by the whole of
humanity, and she argues that all other meaningful concepts should be
definable in terms of these primes. Thus, Wierzbicka explains,
inside all languages we can find a small shared lexicon and a small shared
grammar. Together, this panhuman lexicon and the panhuman grammar linked
with it represent a mini-language, apparently shared by the whole of human-
kind. On the one hand, this mini-language is an intersection of all the langua-
ges of the world. On the other hand, it is, as we see it, the innate language
of human thoughts, corresponding to what Leibniz called “lingua naturae.”
Obviously, this language has no sound system, but it can be incarnated in the
sound system of any language. (2015, p. 385-386)
And she provides a list of the English language version of these terms,
which she thinks empirical research shows can be found in all natural
languages. So, for example, Wierzbicka argues that equivalents to the
English words “I”, “you”, “someone”, “people” and “body” are found in all
languages. In contrast, many languages lack an equivalent for the English
“object”. 12 Now, because of the fact that it is not found in all language,
10. Couturat (1903, p. 435), translated by Anna Wierzbicka.
11. Ibid., p. 430, translated by Anna Wierzbicka.
12. Table 14.1 (2015, p. 385)
Semantic primes (English exponents), grouped into related categories:
I, YOU, SOMEONE, SOMETHING~THING, PEOPLE, BODY substantives
KIND, PART relational substantives
THIS, THE SAME, OTHER~ELSE determiners
ONE, TWO, MUCH~MANY, LITTLE~FEW, SOME, ALL quantifiers
GOOD, BAD evaluators
BIG, SMALL descriptors
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Common Sense and Comparative Linguistics 83
Wierzbicka is skeptical about the central use of this term in developmental
psychology and philosophy, arguing that “the abstract words entity and
object used in philosophical and semi-philosophical language have no
counterparts in most natural languages” (2015, p. 391). She suggests that
the best translation of the ordinary meaning of the English word object into
the NSM metalanguage is something like the following:
An object is,
One something
Someone can see this something
Someone can touch this something with the hands on all sides
This something is not something living
This is not, however, how most philosophers and cognitive scientists
use this word. And thus, she argues that:
From the perspective of cross-cultural semantics, the most likely concep-
tual tool that infants may have for analyzing perceptual input is not OBJECT
but SOMETHING, and the neonate’s responsiveness to human faces suggests
that, from the outset, in the infant’s mind SOMETHING has its counterpart in
SOMEONE, and that the two are not subsumed by the infant under one general
category such as OBJECT. (2015, p. 391)
And she assumes that this purported fact about infant cognition also
carries over to adults. And so, we should be skeptical of any philosophi-
cal account of cognition that gives a central role to the notion of an
object, as being based on a particular contingent linguistic framework.
Now, the motivation behind this project is recognizably Reidian, as
it is motivated by an appeal to common sense and a desire to avoid
appealing to contingent features of particular natural languages. Thus,
she claims,
NSM […] provides us with a neutral tool for describing all languages. The
point is that if the meanings encoded in one language are described through
the categories of another language, for example, Russian or Japanese meanings
KNOW, THINK, WANT, DON’T WANT, FEEL, SEE, HEAR mental predicates
SAY, WORDS, TRUE speech
DO, HAPPEN, MOVE, TOUCH actions, events, movement, contact
THERE IS, BE (SOMEWHERE), BE (SOMEONE/SOMETHING) existence,
location, specification
MINE possession
LIVE, DIE life and death
WHEN~TIME, NOW, BEFORE, AFTER, A LONG TIME, A SHORT TIME,
FOR SOME TIME, MOMENT time
WHERE~PLACE, HERE, ABOVE, BELOW, FAR, NEAR, SIDE, INSIDE space
NOT, MAYBE, CAN, BECAUSE, IF logical concepts
VERY, MORE intensifier
LIKE~AS~WAY similarity
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through English words, these meanings often get distorted, and an Anglo slant
is imposed on them. If, on the other hand, we describe such meanings through
the universal mini-language NSM, even in its English version, we can avoid
such distortion. (2015, p. 386) 13
Now, while it might be helpful to have a common meta-language to
clear up inter-linguistic misunderstandings, Wierzbicka seems to think
that translatability into this Natural Semantic Metalanguage also has
philosophical significance with terms not translatable in these terms
being suspect. In this regard, Wierzbicka’s project seems to have some
affinities with the anti-metaphysical project of a number of early ana-
lytic philosophers. We now tend to remember the positivists stress on
ideal logical languages and tend to forget that many of them were also
strong advocates of forms of common or universal natural languages.
Thus, a number of early analytic philosophers were interested in the
idea of creating a simplified “universal” natural language. For example,
Charles Ogdon, the author of The Meaning of Meaning and editor of
Wittgenstein, invented “basic English”, which is a condensed version
of standard English with a reduced vocabulary of 850 words, which
was supposed to be a “transparent medium for expressing empirical
concepts”. Carnap learnt Esperanto when he was 14 and was a lifelong
proponent of what were known as “International Auxiliary Languages”.
And Neurath was a strong proponent of Esperanto, and tried to develop
what he called a universal visual language, which he named Isotype
(which stand for “International System of Typographic Pictorial Educa-
tion”) which he called a “pictorial Esperanto”. 14 Thus, the NSM
project, in addition to its relationship to Reidian common sense philoso-
phy, also has affinities with the early analytic (anti-metaphysical)
project.
13. Similarly, she argues that “what NSM researchers see as particularly
important is that NSM offers a unified framework for the study of communication
and cognition, of adult and child language, and of humans and nonhuman primates
and early hominins […] a framework that is independent of particular languages
and cultures and free of the Anglocentrism and “scientism” that plague most con-
temporary debates in human sciences. It may seem more scientific to rely in our
analyses on Latinate terms such as object, intention, agency, and perceive rather
than on terms like something, want, do, and see. The fact is, however, that those
simpler and more naïve-sounding ones are both cross-translatable and attested in
children’s speech. These simpler words are experience-near and therefore (in the
area of human thinking) evidence-near. […] Thus, English exponents of universally
attested concepts like DO and SEE (used in preference to AGENCY and PER-
CEIVE) can free our analysis from Anglocentrism and scientism at the same time”
(2015, p. 389).
14. For a good discussion of this attraction to a universal natural language in
early analytic philosophy, see Aray (2014) and (2019).
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Common Sense and Comparative Linguistics 85
What are we to make of all this?
Now, it seems to me that such a position is far too strong. And in
this I agree with Reid, who, in a passage quoted earlier argues that
“There may be distinctions that have a real foundation and which may
be necessary in philosophy, which are not made in common language,
because not necessary in the common business of life.” (2002, p. 27.)
Thus, Reid is happy to admit that philosophical terminology can go
beyond the vocabulary of everyday life. But the question Wierzbicka
will ask is whether this vocabulary, if it is to be meaningful, must be
translatable into our common sense vocabulary. And her Leibnizian
answer seems to be yes. I think this is a mistake and denies the possi-
bility of the creation of genuinely novel concepts.
Now, I think the key mistake of NSM is that it is committed to the
position that apart from innate primitive concepts, all other concepts
have a compositional definitional structure. This claim seems obviously
wrong to me. But similar basic ideas have been quite common in lin-
guistics and cognitive science in general. And I think that if this claim
is correct, then the NSM position becomes much more plausible. For
example, Jackendoff has argued that:
The only reasonable way anyone has been able to conceive of a word
meaning within a cognitive theory is in terms of states of a combinatorial
system. […] The full class of humanly possible concepts (or conceptual struc-
tures) is determined by the combinatorial principles of the Conceptual Well
Formedness Rules. That is, the Conceptual Well-Formedness Rules character-
ize the space of possible conceptual states – the resources available in the
brain for forming concepts. The set of concepts attained by any particular
person will be some subset of these. (1992, p. 53-54)
And many cognitive scientists (for example Fodor and those committed
to Bayesian models) are committed to the view that all learning is to be
understood as hypothesis testing, which also denies the possibility of
the creation of novel concepts in learning, as the hypotheses to be
tested have to be representable before the learning process begins.
Analogous views are to be found expressed by many cognitive scientists
and linguists. So her form of compositional semantics, however implau-
sible, is not a fringe position.
Now, the problem is that there seem to be a huge number of per-
fectly good concepts that are not translatable into all known language.
For example the Mundurukú and Pirahã peoples of Brazil do not have
full counting systems. Thus, the Mundurukú only possess a few number
words, going up to about 5, and do not count using these numbers
(Dehaene, 1997, p. 261). Now, it would seem that there is no way to
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translate the twin prime hypothesis into the language of the Pirahã or
Mundurukú, but this gives us no reason to question its meaningfulness.
There seems to be no way to define the concept of prime number in
terms of their own vocabulary. This does not mean that they are unable
to learn such concepts, but this learning cannot be in terms of learning
a new definition. Instead, to learn such new concepts requires being
immersed in a set of embodied practices. As Stanislas Dehaene has con-
vincingly argued, “progress on the conceptual scale of arithmetic depends
on the mastery of a toolkit of mathematical inventions” (ibid., p. 263). To
learn arithmetical concepts one has to learn how to count, which in part
involves memorizing an arbitrary ordered sequence of symbols. Without
mastering this practice one cannot learn arithmetical concepts. The
concept of “prime number” cannot be defined compositionally in terms
of the concepts of an infant who has not yet learnt to count.
A similar story may be told about, say, the computational theory of
mind. Understanding what it is for something to be “computational”
requires the mastery of formal logic, and perhaps an experience of
modern computers. It seems implausible to claim that for the computa-
tional theory of mind to make sense it should be translatable into the
language of Descartes and should be in principle understandable by
Descartes without him having to learn a whole slew of new techniques
and practices. And I doubt whether Descartes himself could have prop-
erly understood the hardware/software distinction. Once again, this, in
itself, should not automatically lead us to question this distinction.
In this, I am in sympathy with Susan Carey who argues convincingly
for the existence of such novel concepts, which she argues can be learnt
through a process of what she calls “Quinean Boot-strapping”. 15 So, if
Carey is right, even if we assume that Wierzbicka is right that there is
a universally shared set of innate concepts, and that the best way to
discover them is through cross-cultural linguistic analysis, this does not
imply that we should be suspicious of any claims that are not translata-
ble into this basic vocabulary. 16 So let me finish the paper by discuss-
ing Carey’s arguments for the possibility of novel concepts, that are not
definable in terms of innate concepts. Thus Carey argues that:
15. As many have pointed out, Carey herself is not particularly clear about
what she means by “quinean boot-strapping”. Central to the idea is the claim that
the child is able to acquire novel concepts through the use of placeholders, such
as when children memorize a count list on their way to acquiring natural number
concepts. For a good discussion see Beck (2017).
16. And I should add that I am skeptical of Wierzbicka’s apparent assumption
that the fact that certain words are found in all languages is evidence that the
concepts they express are innate, because they may be learnt by all individuals
because the life circumstances they find themselves in are similar.
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Common Sense and Comparative Linguistics 87
With respect to developmental change, contrary to continuity theorists such
as Fodor, Pinker, and others, there are major discontinuities over the course
of conceptual development. By “discontinuity” I mean qualitative changes in
representational structure, in which the later emerging system of representation
cannot be expressed in terms of the conceptual resources available at the
earlier time. Conceptual development consists of episodes of qualitative
change, resulting in systems of representation with more expressive power than,
and sometimes incommensurable with, those from which they are built.
(2015, p. 417)
And she compares her position with that of those (like Wierzbicka) who
think that all new concepts must be defined by starting off with a base
of semantic primes, arguing that:
A kind of logical constructivism is at the heart of Fodor’s, Rey’s, and, at
least implicitly, Rips and colleagues’ dialectic. These writers, like many others,
take expressive power to be a function of innate primitives and of what can
— in principle if not in fact — be built from them using the resources of the
logic available to the learner. Expressive power is a logical and semantic
notion. As long as the characterization of learning mechanisms is exhausted
by specifying the set of innate primitives and the logical resources through
which one builds new representations from those primitives, clearly one cannot
increase expressive power by learning. My response to this picture of learning
and conceptual development is to argue that learning mechanisms can create
new primitives, new primitives that cannot be constructed from antecedently
existent primitives by logical combination, and thus increase the expressive
power of the conceptual system. In addition, my concern is with how new
primitives actually come into being; if there are processes that yield new primi-
tives, then the question is whether such processes actually underlie the emer-
gence of any given representation. (2015, p. 416)
Carey argues that there are two ways of acquiring new primitives:
(1) Innate learning mechanisms (for learning new natural kind terms,
for example) and (2) what she calls “Quinean Bootstrapping”, which
she argues is at the basis of the learning of new arithmetical concepts.
Thus she argues that:
One example is learning the natural number system, which requires learn-
ing an arbitrary ordered list. I have argued here that the numeral list represen-
tation of number is a representational resource with power that transcends any
single representational system available to prelinguistic infants. When the
child, at around age 3 ½, has mastered how the count sequence represents
number, he or she can in principle precisely represent any positive integer.
Before that, he or she has only the quantificational resources of natural langua-
ges, parallel individuation representations that implicitly represent small
numbers, and analog magnitude representations that provide approximate rep-
resentations of the cardinal values of sets. (2015, p. 328)
Carey seems right to me in her account of how a child is able
to learn adult numerical concepts. And if she is right, the Leibnizian
Revue philosophique, no 1/2021, p. 71 à p. 88
Pixellence - 21-12-20 16:23:18 - (c) Humensis
RE0143 U000 - Oasys 19.00x - Page 87 - BAT









































































compositional semantics on which Wierzbicka bases her arguments is
false. However, even if her commitment to compositional semantics is
mistaken, I do not think this renders NSM philosophically uninterest-
ing, for translatability into all languages does seem to have some philo-
sophical significance and to be a touch-stone of something. However,
rather than regarding such translatability as a semantic criterion for
meaningfulness, one should regard such translatability as an epistemic
criterion, as a mark that certain concepts or distinctions are a part of
common sense. And the value that such a criterion can play is showing




17. Funding for work on this paper was provided by Boğaziçi BAP project
(#15681) on “Kant, Reid and Contemporary Moral Psychology”.
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